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“UNDETECTED, UNSUSPECTED, AND 
UNKNOWN”:  SHOULD WE ANTICIPATE 
PROBLEMS FOR SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION 




Once termed the “metaphysics” of patent law, the doctrine of inherent 
anticipation has befuddled courts and practitioners alike for decades.  
Inherent anticipation refers to the notion that a previously published 
reference can disclose each and every limitation of a later-patented 
invention without expressly delineating those limitations.  These 
(un)disclosed limitations are necessarily present, or inherent, within the 
previously published reference.  When a previously published reference 
discloses a later-claimed invention expressly or inherently, the patent 
covering the later-claimed invention is invalid because the invention lacks 
novelty.  Thus, the doctrine of inherent anticipation allows invalidation of a 
patent in whole or in part upon a showing that a prior reference contained 
a patentee’s later-disclosed invention, even if the earlier reference did not 
expressly disclose what the patentee claimed as his invention. 
Courts, including the Federal Circuit, have grappled with whether a 
person having ordinary skill in the relevant art must recognize inherent 
features in the prior art reference for the doctrine of inherent anticipation 
to apply.  The resulting intracircuit split in Federal Circuit case law 
fostered two competing schools of thought on this issue.  The Federal 
Circuit eventually held that recognition of inherent features is not required.  
Commentators, however, have called upon the court to revisit the doctrine 
due to its potential chilling effects on innovation.  This Note suggests that 
the Federal Circuit should reexamine the doctrine, paying particular 
attention to considerations of whether or not a person having ordinary skill 
in the art was capable of identifying inherent features in the asserted prior 
art reference.  Clarification, or even outright reformation, of the inherent 
anticipation doctrine grows more imperative as our technological 
capabilities quickly outpace our legal rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Humans lit fires for thousands of years before realizing that oxygen is 
necessary to create and maintain a flame.  The first person to discover the 
necessity of oxygen certainly could not have obtained a valid patent claim 
for “a method of making a fire by lighting a flame in the presence of 
oxygen.”  Even if prior art on lighting fires did not disclose the 
importance of oxygen and one of ordinary skill in the  art did not know 
about the importance of oxygen, understanding this law of nature would 
not give the discoverer a right to exclude others from practicing  the prior 
art of making fires.1 
The doctrine of inherent anticipation has been described as “a puzzle that 
runs throughout patent law,”2 a “troublesome area of U.S. patent law,”3 and 
 
 1. EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
 2. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 372 
(2005). 
 3. Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent 
Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2008). 
2013] PROBLEMS AFTER SCHERING CORP.? 167 
a “doctrinal morass.”4  The cases forming the underlying basis for the 
doctrine of inherent anticipation are confusing, at best, and the resulting 
opinions invoking the doctrine are confused, at worst.5 
At its core, the doctrine of inherent anticipation functions to preclude 
patent protection for new inventions when a previously published reference 
discloses “each and every limitation”6 of the invention sought to be 
patented.7  U.S. patent laws prescribe that only new inventions may be 
patented.8  Obviously, an invention is not new (i.e., novel) when it already 
exists, and is therefore ineligible for patent protection.9  Similarly, an 
invention is not patentable if it has been expressly described in the prior art 
(such as in previously filed specifications in patent applications, journal 
articles, or other printed publications).10  However, “[t]echnologies may 
have qualities that are unappreciated or unidentified in a patent description, 
but which are nonetheless present.  The law refers to these unknown 
attributes as ‘inherent’ in the product or process.”11  The doctrine of 
inherency allows for invalidation of a patent, in whole or in part, when a 
prior art reference does not expressly disclose each and every limitation of 
the claimed invention.12  A patent is not novel (or patentable) for inherency 
when a single prior art reference inherently describes a missing feature of 
the claimed invention, so long as the missing feature is a deliberate or a 
 
 4. Id. at 1103. 
 5. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 373 (“The cases appear to flatly contradict each 
other, are often accompanied by dissents, and in the last three years alone have triggered one 
abortive en banc rehearing and strong calls for a second.” (citation omitted)). 
 6. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (“[T]he object of the patent law 
in requiring the patentee to particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, 
or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery, is not only to secure to him all 
to which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open to them.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 7. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003), reh’g 
denied, 348 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 8. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  Further conditions for patentability are outlined in Title 
35 of the U.S. Code.  Briefly, an invention is eligible for patent protection when it is new, 
useful, nonobvious, and directed at statutorily acceptable subject matter. See id. §§ 101–03.  
The first paragraph of section 112 further demands that patent applicants set forth a written 
description sufficient to prove that they possessed the claimed invention at the time of the 
application filing, this description must be enough to enable one skilled in the art to make 
and use the invention. See id. § 112, para. 1; see also Ariad Pharms. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that the first paragraph of § 112  
contains a written description requirement separate from enablement).  Finally, the patent 
application must conclude with claims particularly delineating the bounds of the invention. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2. 
 9. See 35 U.S.C § 102.  An invention that is determined not to be novel is said to be 
“anticipated.” See infra Part I.A. 
 10. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.  Specifically, section 102(b) states, “A person shall be entitled 
to a patent unless . . . the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this 
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to 
the date of the application for patent.”  Essentially, the prior art, or the current state of the 
art, sets forth the technological background against which the novelty and nonobviousness of 
an invention are examined. See C. Douglas Thomas, Secret Prior Art—Get Your Priorities 
Straight!, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 147, 148 (1996). 
 11. Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 372. 
 12. See Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1377. 
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necessary consequence of what was intended.13  The Federal Circuit has 
explained that the doctrine of inherent anticipation requires certainty of 
result.14  If the missing feature of the invention is determined to be present 
in a prior art reference as a result of an accident, the doctrine of inherent 
anticipation is not invoked and the patent covering the invention is not 
invalid for inherent anticipation.15 
For decades, the case law invoking the doctrine suffered from conflicting 
opinions on one particular issue:  must a person having ordinary skill in the 
art (commonly referred to as “PHOSITA”)16 recognize the existence of the 
missing (inherent) feature?17  Some cases explained that a PHOSITA must 
recognize the inherent feature before the doctrine may be used to defeat a 
patent or some of its claims;18 others held the exact opposite, explaining 
that inherent anticipation precludes patentability so long as the inherent 
feature is an inevitable consequence of practicing the prior art, whether or 
not PHOSITA recognizes the inherent feature.19  In its seminal—and 
controversial—2003 decision, Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,20 the Federal Circuit explained that the doctrine of inherent 
anticipation does not require recognition of the inherent feature by a 
PHOSITA.21 
In Schering Corp., the Federal Circuit invalidated a patent claim to a 
metabolite22 as inherently anticipated in light of the prior art, in this case a 
patent for the parent drug.23  The court explained that the patent for the 
parent drug precluded patentability of all of its future metabolites, presently 
known or unknown, since all metabolites would necessarily be formed 
when an individual ingests the parent drug.24  The Schering Corp. decision 
 
 13. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 3.03[2][c] (2013) (citing Glaxo 
Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 830 F. Supp. 871, 877 (E.D.N.C. 1993), aff’d, 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 988 (1995) (finding that a method set forth an example in 
one patent did not inherently anticipate claims to a variant form of a compound claimed in a 
second patent because the “proper practice” of the example sometimes resulted in the 
claimed form and sometimes resulted in another form)). 
 14. See Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1377 (“[A] prior art reference may anticipate 
without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if that missing characteristic is 
necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” (emphasis added) 
(citing  Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991))). 
 15. See Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711–12 (1880). 
 16. For a more detailed description of the hypothetical person having ordinary skill in 
the art (PHOSITA), see infra Part I. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part II.A. 
 19. See infra Part II.B. 
 20. 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 21. See id. at 1377 (“At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent 
anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”). 
 22. See id. at 1375 (“A metabolite is the compound formed in the patient’s body upon 
ingestion of a pharmaceutical. The ingested pharmaceutical undergoes a chemical 
conversion in the digestion process to form a new metabolite compound.”). 
 23. See id. at 1380. 
 24. See id. (“[T]he record shows that a patient ingesting [the parent drug] would 
necessarily metabolize that compound to [a metabolite].  That later act would thus [be an act 
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diverged from earlier precedent, however, in its holding vis-à-vis 
metabolites:  all future metabolites of a patented parent drug—whether or 
not they are recognized by a PHOSITA at the time the parent drug is 
patented—are inherently anticipated25 by the parent drug and are ineligible 
for patent protection.26 
Several commentators believe that the Schering Corp. decision represents 
a carefully considered balancing act by a Federal Circuit attempting to 
preserve the goals of the patent system27—namely, to foster innovation by 
providing inventors with an exclusive time-limited monopoly to make their 
invention on the one hand, and ensuring that the public receives the benefit 
of the invention via full disclosure on the other.28  The Schering Corp. 
decision may be explained in light of these public policy goals; perhaps the 
court was concerned with what it perceived to be patent “evergreening.”29  
 
of patent infringement].  Thus, a prior art reference showing administration of [the parent 
drug] to a patient anticipates claims [to the metabolite].”). 
 25. Essentially, they are not “novel,” and fail the novelty requirement for patentability 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 26. See Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1380–81. 
 27. See Cynthia Chen, Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.:  Clarification of 
the Inherent Anticipation Doctrine and Its Implications, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 95, 96 
(2005) (“The Schering decision represents an effort by the Federal Circuit to balance two 
conflicting goals of the patent system:  to stimulate inventive efforts by giving inventors 
exclusive rights for a limited period and to allow the public at large to derive benefits from 
the advances in technology.”); Alfredo De La Rosa, A Hard Pill to Swallow:  Does Schering 
v. Geneva Endanger Innovation Within the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 8 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 37, 87 (2007) (“Schering attempted to prevent generic drug manufacturers 
from practicing the . . . patent, even after it had entered the public domain. The Federal 
Circuit was understandably troubled by this notion.”); Mueller & Chisum, supra note 3, at 
1163 (“In cases such as Schering, the Federal Circuit has wielded the doctrine of anticipation 
by inherency as a rather blunt instrument to combat perceived patent evergreening.”). 
 28. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63–64 (1998) (citing Seymour v. 
Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533–34 (1870)).  In Seymour, the Supreme Court 
explained: 
Letters patent are . . . public franchises granted to the inventors of new and useful 
improvements for the purpose of securing to them, as such inventors, for the 
limited term therein mentioned, the exclusive right and liberty to make and use and 
vend to others to be used their own inventions, as tending to promote the progress 
of science and the useful arts, and as matter of compensation to the inventors for 
their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions, and reducing the same to 
practice for the public benefit, as contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned 
by the laws of Congress. 
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 533–34. 
 29. Patent evergreening is not a formal patent law concept, but rather a strategy by 
which a patentee obtains, or attempts to obtain, multiple patents that cover different aspects 
of the same invention in an effort to extend the term of the patent and the exclusivity 
privileges that come with it. See Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1378 
n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that new drug application (NDA) holders may evergreen their 
patents “by filing a series of applications for different patents covering the same basic 
drug”); see also Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products:  Anticipating Hatch-Waxman 
Issues During the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 250 (1999) 
(explaining that by filing and refiling “improvement” patents for the same basic drug—such 
as disectable tablets, special coatings, new formulations, crystalline forms of the same drug, 
and variations on drug delivery technologies—companies may essentially “evergreen their 
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Although the effect the opinion will have on scientific innovation is 
debatable,30 the rule promulgated under Schering Corp. has effectively 
settled the argument for the time being about whether a PHOSITA must 
recognize the inherent feature, unless and until the Supreme Court weighs 
in. 
In the Schering Corp. opinion, the Federal Circuit provided some 
guidance to future patent drafters about how to circumvent the inherent 
anticipation doctrine with respect to metabolites.31  In light of the rapid 
advancement of the study of metabolites, and an ever-expanding base of 
scientific knowledge in general, however, it behooves the Federal Circuit to 
reexamine the inherent anticipation doctrine.  This Note focuses on the 
evolution and application of the inherent anticipation doctrine in the case 
law. 
Part I of this Note begins by providing a brief introduction to U.S. patent 
law.  Specifically, it focuses on the statutory provisions regarding novelty 
and anticipation.  It also outlines the evolution of the inherent anticipation 
doctrine from early U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Part II examines the intracircuit split that developed within the Federal 
Circuit as the court struggled to determine whether PHOSITA recognition 
of the inherent feature was necessary for a finding of inherent anticipation.  
It then describes the Federal Circuit’s seminal decision in Schering Corp. 
and predicts the future of metabolite research in the wake of the 
controversial rule that PHOSITA recognition is dispensable in an inherent 
anticipation analysis. 
Finally, Part III examines proposals for changes to the inherent 
anticipation doctrine.  This Note then argues for a new “capability” standard 
that would focus on what a PHOSITA was capable of discovering at the 
time the prior art was published.  This Note concludes by arguing that much 
of the confusion in the inherent anticipation doctrine may be avoided by 
simply focusing on what an inventor was capable of identifying at the time 
of the prior art. 
I.  A PATENT LAW PRIMER 
Mark Twain famously opined, “I knew that a country without a patent 
office and good patent laws was just a crab, and couldn’t travel any way but 
sideways or backwards.”32  The U.S. Constitution expressly mandates the 
patent system, which in turn provides to inventors a time-limited monopoly 
to make and practice their inventions, and to exclude others from doing the 
 
drug patents”).  One such evergreening example relevant to this Note could be the attempted 
patenting of a derivative of an existing drug. 
 30. Compare Chen, supra note 27 (arguing that the necessary and inevitable 
consequence test promulgated under Schering Corp. will not harm future metabolite 
research), with De La Rosa, supra note 27 (arguing that the inherent anticipation doctrine 
will endanger pharmaceutical innovation and encourage recourse to trade secrets). 
 31. See Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1381; see also infra Part II.C. 
 32. MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR’S COURT 72 (Bernard L. 
Stein ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 3d ed. 1979) (1889). 
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same.33  To be eligible for patent protection, however, an invention must 
satisfy the basic requirements for patentability;34 specifically, the invention 
must be new (i.e., novel), useful, and nonobvious.  The requirement that an 
invention be novel, prescribed by 35 U.S.C. § 102, is the cornerstone of the 
patent system.35  Novelty is defeated, however, when the invention already 
exists.36 
To examine novelty, courts scrutinize the claimed invention in light of 
the “prior art,”37 which represents the entirety of the “preexisting 
knowledge and technology already available to the public.”38  The public 
policy behind the novelty provision is to promote efficient research—to put 
“libraries before laboratories, investigation before investment.”39  A 
previously published document asserted against a claimed invention to 
defeat its novelty is commonly referred to as a “prior art reference.”40  A 
prior art reference defeats novelty when (1) it predates the applicant’s 
invention, (2) it discloses each and every limitation41 of the claimed 
invention (either expressly or inherently), and (3) it is enabling (the 
reference teaches a person having ordinary skill in the art how to make and 
use the invention without undue experimentation).42  When a prior art 
 
 33. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).  An applicant 
whose invention satisfies the requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and utility, and who 
discloses his invention to the public is granted “the right to exclude others from using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States” for a period of 20 
years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). 
 34. See id. §§ 101–03. 
 35. See id. § 102; see also MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 75 
(2008) (“Novelty, the most fundamental characteristic of patentability, ensures that an 
inventor has truly created something new.”). 
 36. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 75. 
 37. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.  “Prior art” may refer to any printed publication, issued patent, 
or other document asserted against the claimed invention to defeat its novelty. 
 38. Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 922 (2011); 
see also Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“[T]he real reason for the denial of patent rights . . . is the basic principle (to which there are 
minor exceptions) that no patent should be granted which withdraws from the public domain 
technology already available to the public.” (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 
(1966))). 
 39. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 75. 
 40. Seymore, supra note 38, at 922. 
 41. Claim limitations stake out the limits of the patentee’s property right. See Renishaw 
PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248–49 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 
claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, 
begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim.”).  Thus, claim limitations 
are the words of the claim detailing the specific elements of the invention. See ADELMAN ET 
AL., supra note 35 at 218–19 (explaining that claims must describe complex subject matter in 
terms broad enough to foresee and capture future related technology and narrow, or limited, 
enough to distinguish all past related technology). 
 42. Seymore, supra note 38, at 922–23.  The PHOSITA is a legal fiction of patent law, 
considered to possess the normal skills and knowledge of a person in the field, without being 
a genius. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(explaining that a PHOSITA is “not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the 
law”).  The PHOSITA is similar to the reasonably prudent person in tort law, and his 
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reference successfully defeats the novelty of a claimed invention, that 
invention is said to be “anticipated.”43  A finding of anticipation thus 
renders the invention unpatentable as a result of the technology already 
being within the public domain.44  Part I.A first describes anticipation 
generally.  Part I.B then traces the evolution of the inherent anticipation 
doctrine, as it grew out of an earlier doctrine termed “accidental 
anticipation.” 
A.  Anticipation Generally 
A famous patent law adage recites, “That which infringes, if later, would 
anticipate, if earlier.”45  A patent cannot issue on an invention or 
technology already within the public domain; to allow a patentee an 
exclusive monopoly over public technology is injurious to society as a 
whole and does not incentivize innovation.46  The novelty provision 
guarantees to the public the right to make and use that which it already 
possesses.47 
An invention that is anticipated by the prior art is not novel.48  
Anticipation is a pure question of fact.49  Courts assess anticipation using a 
two-step analysis:  (1) by analyzing the current state of public knowledge as 
indicated by the prior art, and (2) by examining each prior art reference 
individually to determine if a single reference discloses each and every 
limitation of the claimed invention.50  Assessing the novelty of a simple 
 
hypothetical construction can change depending on several factors, such as “(1) the 
educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art 
solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication 
of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Envtl. Designs, 
Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 43. See Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, 
either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”). 
 44. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 75–76. 
 45. Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889). 
 46. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) 
(stating that to allow a patentee a patent on an anticipated invention “would in fact injure the 
public by removing existing knowledge from public use”); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (holding that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to authorize the 
issuance of patents that would remove existing knowledge from the public domain). 
 47. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453–54 (Fed. Cir. 
1984).  The Federal Circuit stated: 
That is the real meaning of ‘prior art’ in legal theory—it is knowledge that is 
available, including what would be obvious from it, at a given time, to a person of 
ordinary skill in an art. Society, speaking through Congress and the courts, has said 
“thou shalt not take it away.”  
Id. 
 48. See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1367 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991) (citing Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 
1985)). 
 49. See id. (“[A]nticipation is a factual determination.”). 
 50. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 76.  The limitations of the claimed invention 
are defined by the claims in the patent application. See id. at 218.  The claims are “the fence 
around the inventor’s property right,” defining the boundaries of the patentee’s right to 
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invention might be a relatively trivial task.51  Determining the novelty of an 
invention directed at more complex subject matter, however, proves an 
increasingly difficult endeavor.52  For example, consider the interesting 
case of Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner.53  In Titanium Metals Corp., the 
patent at issue was directed at a titanium-nickel-molybdenum alloy that 
resisted corrosion in hot brine environments.54  The patent recited three 
claims for a base titanium-nickel-molybdenum alloy consisting of 0.2 
percent to 0.4 percent molybdenum and 0.6 percent to 0.9 percent nickel 
that could also contain iron.55 
The relevant prior art reference asserted against the patent to defeat its 
novelty was a highly technical three-page Russian article in the Russian 
language.56  The article displayed graphical data generated by various 
titanium-nickel-molybdenum alloys, including one alloy having 0.25 
percent molybdenum and 0.75 percent nickel by weight.57  Although the 
Russian article did not disclose resistance to corrosion in hot brine 
environments, the court held that the Russian article anticipated Claims 1 
and 2 because the alloy was not new; the Russian alloy clearly fell within 
the recited ranges of the claimed invention.58 
 
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, and importing inventive 
technology. See id. at 218. 
 51. See Seymore, supra note 38, at 923–25 (posing the example of a paper clip made 
from an alloy of titanium and nickel; thus, an anticipating prior art reference must disclose a 
paper clip made from titanium and nickel). 
 52. See id.  For example, consider a patent directed at the chemical and biological arts 
that discloses a specific drug X.  Patents directed at drug molecules are typically broad in 
scope, even though they disclose specific molecular structures, because the claims are 
drafted in such a manner as to ensnare every compound using the basic molecular backbone 
of the patented molecule.  For example, U.S. Patent No. 5,422,351 is directed at “Bis-benzo 
or benzopyrido cyclohepta piperidene, piperidylidene and piperazine compounds” and their 
pharmaceutically acceptable salts having a particular structural formula, the claims of which 
encompass at least one novemdecillion (1060, or one followed by sixty zeroes) separate 
compounds. See Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 
1028 n.225 (2012); see also U.S. Patent No. 5,422,351 (filed June 21, 1991). 
 53. 778 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 54. See id. at 776. 
 55. See id.  The claims at issue recited: 
1. A titanium base alloy consisting essentially by weight of about 0.6% to 0.9% 
nickel, 0.2% to 0.4% molybdenum, up to 0.2% maximum iron, balance titanium, 
said alloy being characterized by good corrosion resistance in hot brine 
environments. 
2. A titanium base alloy as set forth in Claim 1 having up to 0.1% iron, balance 
titanium. 
3. A titanium base alloy as set forth in Claim 1 having 0.8% nickel, 0.3% 
molybdenum, up to 0.1% maximum iron, balance titanium.  
Id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. at 776–77.  This composition clearly falls within the claimed percentages 
recited within claims 1 and 2 of the patent. 
 58. See id. at 782 (“[C]laims 1 and 2 . . . properly construed . . . are anticipated under 
§ 102 by the Russian article which admittedly discloses an alloy on which these claims 
read.”). 
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Biotechnology inventions59 pose their own special problems when it 
comes to anticipation.60  Notwithstanding the fact that laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable,61 a patentee 
must differentiate the claimed invention from any previously existing, 
naturally occurring compounds to satisfy the novelty requirement.62  This 
can be a daunting challenge, as much of life science research involves “the 
elucidation of biological mechanisms already long present in nature.”63  A 
patentee can successfully differentiate his invention from a naturally 
occurring compound by isolating the compound in its purified form.64  This 
challenge is especially difficult when the invention concerns metabolites.65  
For example, secondary metabolites, which are derived from primary 
metabolites, tend to be biologically synthesized in specialized cell types and 
at distinct developmental stages, limiting their existence in time and 
quantity.66 
A patentee that manages to extract, purify, and isolate a useful metabolite 
also faces a potential inherency problem.67  The nature of biological 
research typically proceeds with some observable experimental finding only 
to be understood long after the discovery, if at all.68  Thus, publication of an 
 
 59. This term refers to inventions in the biological, chemical and pharmaceutical arts. 
 60. See Paul G. Alloway, Inherently Difficult Analysis for Inherent and Accidental 
Biotechnology Inventions, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 73, 75 (2004) (“One problem with 
biotechnology inventions is that they often relate to discoveries of already-existing natural 
biological compositions or mechanisms.”). 
 61. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (describing the statutory requirements for patentable 
subject matter).  Section 101 states, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.” Id.  The Supreme Court held that section 101 is not so broad as to 
encompass naturally occurring biological or chemical products. See Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 62. See Alloway, supra note 60, at 75 (noting that inherency is “particularly 
problematic” for biotechnology inventions because they often relate to discoveries of 
already-existing natural biological compositions or mechanisms). 
 63. Jeffery M. Duncan, The Court Is Listening, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 4, 2002, at 2. 
 64. See In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401–02 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“[B]y definition, 
pure materials necessarily differ from less pure or impure materials and, if the latter are the 
only ones existing and available as a standard of reference . . . perforce the ‘pure’ materials 
are ‘new’ with respect to them.”). 
 65. See Manuel F. Balandrin et al., Natural Plant Chemicals:  Sources of Industrial and 
Medicinal Materials, 228 SCIENCE 1154, 1154 (1985) (noting the problems in extracting, 
isolating, and purifying primary and secondary metabolites); Gregory S. Walker et al., 
Validation of Isolated Metabolites from Drug Metabolism Studies As Analytical Standards 
by Quantitative NMR, 39 DRUG METABOLISM & DISPOSITION 433, 433 (2011) (stating that 
many metabolites are difficult and expensive to synthesize chemically). 
 66. See Balandrin, supra note 65, at 1154 (explaining that secondary metabolites are 
frequently accumulated by organisms in smaller quantities than primary metabolites). 
 67. See Alloway, supra note 60, at 75 (“Inherency is particularly problematic for modern 
biotechnology inventions. . . .  [This is because] they often relate to discoveries of already-
existing natural biological compositions.”). 
 68. See id. at 76 (“A second problem that biotechnology inventions often encounter is 
that particular observed biological results and underlying mechanisms of biological action 
are often not understood until well after publication of initial experimental findings.”). 
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initial finding can effectively preclude patent protection for a later 
understanding via the doctrine of inherent anticipation.69 
B.  From Unwitting Result to Necessary Consequence:  
The Evolution of the Inherent Anticipation Doctrine 
Inherent anticipation grew out of an earlier doctrine referred to as 
accidental anticipation,70 which was first discussed in the 1880 Supreme 
Court case Tilghman v. Proctor.71  The Supreme Court held in Tilghman 
that accidental production of a product, “unwittingly produced,” was not 
anticipatory over Tilghman’s invention.72  Tilghman’s patent was directed 
at a method of treating fats and oils by separating them into their respective 
component parts “by the action of water at a high temperature and 
pressure.”73  The Court eventually found Tilghman’s patent not invalid for 
anticipation, noting that the process used by the accused infringer, 
following instructions in the prior art, was never fully understood or 
appreciated.74  As the Court rather bluntly stated, “[They] certainly never 
derived the least hint from this accidental phenomenon in regard to any 
practicable process for manufacturing such acids.”75  Although some 
commentators would later disagree about the implications of the inherent 
anticipation doctrine, they agree that the Court seemed to emphasize a 
PHOSITA’s subjective appreciation in determining whether a prior art 
reference triggers accidental or inherent anticipation.76 
Tilghman, therefore, is a case of accidental anticipation, distinguished 
from inherent anticipation by several factors.77  Although courts treat 
 
 69. See id. (noting that patenting biological and chemical entities is challenging in light 
of both the doctrine of inherent anticipation and technological limitations that often delay 
understanding). 
 70. See Anne Brown & Mark Polyakov, The Accidental and Inherent Anticipation 
Doctrines:  Where Do We Stand and Where Are We Going?, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 63, 63–65 (2004).  The phrase “accidental anticipation” is misleading; pursuant to 
this doctrine prior art does not anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102. See id. 
 71. See generally Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). 
 72. Id. at 711.  The Supreme Court continued: 
If the acids were accidentally and unwittingly produced, whilst the operators were 
in pursuit of other and different results, without exciting attention and without its 
even being known what was done or how it had been done, it would be absurd to 
say that this was an anticipation of Tilghman’s discovery.  
Id. at 711–12. 
 73. Id. at 709. 
 74. See id. at 711. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Chen, supra note 27, at 98 (“The Court emphasized the importance of subjective 
appreciation in the anticipation analysis . . . .”); see also De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 45 
(“The Court’s determination in Tilghman centers on the previous producer’s failure to 
appreciate what had occurred through its actions.”). 
 77. Paul G. Alloway lists several factors that the Federal Circuit considers in 
determining whether an accidental or inherent analysis is prudent, including: 
whether the prior art intended the claimed composition or process; whether the 
prior art includes knowledge of the claimed composition or process; whether the 
prior art includes knowledge of the newly discovered result of the claimed process 
or knowledge of the newly discovered function of the claimed composition; 
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accidental and inherent anticipation as being separate legal theories,78 
pinpointing which factor or set of factors a court will emphasize in 
determining the type of anticipation is difficult.79  As previously mentioned, 
a finding of inherent anticipation means that the patent-defeating result 
inevitably and logically follows from an analysis of the cited prior art.80  
The Federal Circuit’s predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals (CCPA), explained in In re Oerlich, 
Inherency . . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.  The 
mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances 
is not sufficient.  If, however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the 
natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the 
performance of the questioned function, it seems to be well settled that the 
disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.81 
Allowing an applicant to possess intellectual property rights to a claimed 
feature or invention that is inherent in the prior art “is not the law”; such a 
policy would effectively “remove from the public that which is in the public 
domain by virtue of its inclusion in . . . the prior art.”82  Although the 
boundary between accidental and inherent anticipation is unclear, courts are 
reluctant to provide patent protection for claimed inventions already 
available to the public.83 
Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.84 is another case of 
accidental anticipation.  In Eibel Process Co., the Supreme Court 
considered a challenge to Eibel’s patent, which was directed at an improved 
paper-making machine that elevated the pitch of paper-making wire.85  The 
 
whether the prior art includes knowledge of a claimed component in the claimed 
composition; whether the prior art includes knowledge of the function of a 
component in a prior art process or composition; whether the prior art performs the 
claimed process or makes or uses the claimed composition for a different purpose; 
whether the claimed composition is useful in the prior art; whether the claimed 
process is useful to achieve the claimed result in the prior art; and whether the 
claimed process performs occasionally or under unusual conditions in the prior art 
or the claimed composition is formed occasionally or under unusual conditions.  
Alloway, supra note 60, at 91. 
 78. See Am. Original Corp. v. Jenkins Food Corp., 696 F.2d 1053, 1059 (4th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that a patent directed to the hydraulic evisceration of mollusks was valid in light of 
accidental occurrences of incidental shearing in the prior art). But see Bird Provision Co. v. 
Owens Country Sausage, Inc., 568 F.2d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding a patent covering a 
method of processing and packaging of pork sausage invalid for inherent anticipation under 
the prior art, because “the discovery of the process’ shelf life implications involved nothing 
that was new in its use or method of application”). 
 79. See Alloway, supra note 60, at 91–93. 
 80. See In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 81. Id. (quoting Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939)). 
 82. In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 1023 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
 83. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242, 249 (1949) 
(“It is not invention to perceive that the product which others had discovered had qualities 
they failed to detect.”); In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d at 1023; In re Finsterwalder, 436 F.2d 
1028, 1033 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (affirming the rejections of claims in a patent application as 
obvious in view of the prior art). 
 84. 261 U.S. 45 (1923). 
 85. See id. at 52. 
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challengers cited prior art references that described machines that used a 
similar pitch solely for drainage purposes.86  The Court found no evidence 
that any pitch of the wire, before Eibel, had produced Eibel’s results, and 
that the challenger’s results were produced under unusual conditions, “not 
intended and not appreciated.”87  While the Court did not find inherent 
anticipation, it did provide guidance for future courts, explaining that if the 
alleged discovery or invention advanced the art substantially, “then the 
court is liberal in its construction of the patent, to secure to the inventor the 
reward he deserves.”88 
The circumstances giving rise to Tilghman and Eibel Process Co. are 
quite rare and, as a result, these cases continue to be good law.89  
Nevertheless, the accidental anticipation doctrine, received further 
clarification from the Supreme Court in 1949.  In General Electric Co. v. 
Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co.,90 the Court stated that simply finding latent 
qualities in an old discovery and adapting them to a useful end did not meet 
the exacting standards of the U.S. patent system.91  Discovery of an existing 
quality did not “advance the frontiers of science.”92  The court’s decision in 
General Electric Co. did, however, allow for the possibility of patent 
protection for the discovery of a new quality within an old invention, so 
long as it advanced the public’s scientific knowledge.93 
Thus, Tilghman, Eibel Process Co., and several lower court decisions 
that followed generally stand for the proposition that accidental 
achievements do not anticipate later inventions.94  For example, the Second 
Circuit held that anticipation was not established when a prior user did not 
appreciate or have knowledge of the results, stating that “novelty is not 
negatived by a prior accidental production of the same thing when the 
operator does not recognize the means by which the accidental result is 
accomplished, and no knowledge of them, or of the method of their 
employment, is derived from the prior use by any one.”95  The Third Circuit 
similarly held that prior production of an alloy, when unknown by its 
producers and unappreciated as a new product, was “without value as an 
anticipation.”96  Finally, the Sixth Circuit held that the prior accidental 
 
 86. See id. at 58. 
 87. Id. at 66 (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711 (1880)). 
 88. Id. at 63. 
 89. See De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 45–46. 
 90. 326 U.S. 242 (1945). 
 91. See id. at 248–49. 
 92. Id. at 249. 
 93. See id. at 248–49. 
 94. See, e.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 66 (1923); 
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711–12 (1880); Pittsburgh Iron & Steel Foundries Co. v. 
Seaman-Sleeth Co., 248 F. 705, 709 (3d Cir. 1918); Toch v. Zibell Damp Resisting Paint 
Co., 233 F. 993, 997 (2d Cir. 1916); Munising Paper Co. v. Am. Sulphite Pulp Co., 228 F. 
700, 703–04 (6th Cir. 1915). 
 95. Toch, 233 F. at 995. 
 96. Pittsburgh Iron & Steel, 248 F. at 709. 
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production of the same invention with characteristics not recognized until 
the later patent issued did not constitute anticipation.97 
As this Note next describes, when the doctrine of accidental anticipation 
evolved into inherent anticipation, however, the Federal Circuit vacillated 
on the issue of whether or not PHOSITA recognition of the inherent 
characteristic was required for a finding of inherent anticipation.98  Until 
the Schering Corp. decision essentially ended the debate in 2003, two 
schools of thought had emerged in an intracircuit split within the Federal 
Circuit regarding this issue.99 
II.  A PERSON HAVING ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART MUST (SOMETIMES) 
RECOGNIZE THE INHERENT FEATURE:  AN INTRACIRCUIT SPLIT 
Whether or not a prior art reference anticipates an invention is a factual 
determination.100  When a single prior art reference expressly discloses 
each and every limitation of the claimed invention, an anticipation analysis 
is straightforward and the invention is unpatentable for failure to satisfy the 
novelty requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 102.101  But does a prior art 
reference anticipate an invention when it does not expressly disclose each 
and every limitation of the claimed invention?102  If it does anticipate, must 
a PHOSITA recognize the missing limitations of the claimed invention for 
that reference to preclude patentability?103  As this section will describe, the 
Federal Circuit has not always provided clear guidance on these issues.  
Part II.A explores the beginnings of the intracircuit split within Federal 
Circuit case law, holding essentially that a prior art reference anticipates an 
invention when it inherently104 discloses each and every limitation of that 
invention and a PHOSITA recognizes the inherent feature.  Part II.B 
outlines recent Federal Circuit case law in which the inherent anticipation 
doctrine is upheld but a PHOSITA need not recognize the inherent feature.  
Part II.C describes in detail the interesting case of Schering Corp. v. Geneva 
 
 97. See Munising Paper Co., 228 F. at 703. 
 98. See Chisum, supra note 13, § 3.03[2][c]. 
 99. See De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 44–52. 
 100. See supra notes 46–48. 
 101. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 102. The simple answer to this question is yes.  See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 
Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Patent law nonetheless establishes that a prior 
art reference which expressly or inherently contains each and every limitation of the claimed 
subject matter anticipates and invalidates.” (emphasis added) (citing EMI Group N. Am., 
Inc., v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001))). 
 103. As of the publication date of this Note, the short answer to this question is no. See id. 
at 1377. 
 104. The Federal Circuit explained in Schering Corp.:   
In this court’s . . . inherency cases, a single prior art reference generally contained 
an incomplete description of the anticipatory subject matter, i.e., a partial 
description missing certain aspects.  Inherency supplied the missing aspect of the 
description.  Upon proof that the missing description is inherent in the prior art, 
that single prior art reference placed the claimed subject matter in the public 
domain.  
Id. at 1378–79. 
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the seminal Federal Circuit case on this issue.  
Finally, Part II.D examines predictions about the state of metabolite 
research in the wake of the Schering Corp. decision. 
A.  PHOSITA Recognition Required 
The Tilghman case, although largely considered a case of accidental 
anticipation,105 was one of the first cases to state that PHOSITA 
appreciation of the inherent characteristics in the prior art was necessary for 
a finding of inherent anticipation.106  The threshold inquiry for similar cases 
now also categorized as accidental anticipation was whether a PHOSITA 
recognized and appreciated the value of the invention.107 
The 1964 case In re Seaborg supports the proposition that PHOSITA 
recognition is required for inherent anticipation.108  Although the CCPA 
decided the case, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 merged the 
CCPA with the appellate branch of the Court of Claims,109 establishing this 
case as Federal Circuit precedent.  The patent in question was directed at 
Americium (element 95, hereinafter Am), its isotopes, and the methods of 
isolating and purifying it.110  The patent application was initially rejected in 
light of the prior art, specifically that Am had already been produced in the 
Fermi reactor.111  The applicant responded that the Am produced could only 
have been one billionth of a gram “distributed throughout forty tons of 
intensely radioactive uranium reactor fuel,” and that such an amount would 
surely be undetectable if it was present at all.112  The court examined the 
prior art in light of the present technology, and concluded that a prediction 
“with any degree of definiteness” about the formation of Am would require 
an “exercise of more than the ordinary skill of the art.”113  Because a 
PHOSITA could not possibly recognize or produce Am from the prior art, 
the patent was granted.114 
When the CCPA decided the case In re Shetty a little over a decade later, 
PHOSITA recognition as a prerequisite for inherent anticipation seemed all 
but a bright-line rule.115  The invention claimed was “a method . . . of 
curbing appetite in animals by administering certain adamantane 
compounds,” and also pertained to the unit dosage form of a composition 
for curbing appetite comprising such adamantane compounds along with a 
 
 105. See CHISUM, supra note 13, § 3.03[1][a]; Chen, supra note 27, at 97–98; De La 
Rosa, supra note 27 at 45–46. 
 106. See Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711–12 (1880). 
 107. See, e.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Edison 
Elec. Light Co. v. Novelty Incandescent Light Co., 167 F. 977 (3d Cir. 1909). 
 108. See In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 998–99 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
 109. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 110. See In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d at 996–97. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. at 997. 
 113. Id. at 999. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See In re Shetty, 566 F.2d 81, 85 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
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pharmaceutically acceptable carrier.116  The Patent and Trademark Board of 
Appeals had originally rejected the claims as obvious or anticipated in light 
of the prior art.117  The CCPA affirmed the Board’s decision as to one claim 
being invalid for obviousness, but reversed it on the other five.118  The 
court stated, “[Inherency] is quite immaterial if, as the record establishes 
here, one of ordinary skill in the art would not appreciate or recognize that 
inherent result.”119 
The Federal Circuit again held that PHOSITA appreciation of the 
inherent feature was required for a finding of inherent anticipation in Glaxo 
Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd.120  That case concerned ranitidine hydrochloride, a 
“potent histamine blocker” that “inhibit[s] the secretion of stomach 
acid.”121  Glaxo Inc. received a patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,128,658 or the 
‘658 patent) for ranitidine hydrochloride in 1978.122  In 1980, Glaxo ceased 
development of ranitidine using the method claimed in the ‘658 patent, and 
instead used a more efficient method that “yielded ranitidine hydrochloride 
identical in all respects to that originally produced” under the old 
method.123  The new method, however, produced a crystalline version of 
the drug that was “visibly different from all previous batches of the salt.”124  
This new crystalline version, a polymorph, was better suited for commercial 
applications, and was subsequently patented as U.S. Patent No. 4,521,431 
(the ‘431 patent).125  In 1991, Novopharm Ltd., one of Glaxo’s competitors, 
filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), seeking approval to manufacture and sell a 
generic version of the ‘431 patent material in December of 1995, when the 
‘658 patent was set to expire.126  Glaxo then sued Novopharm for patent 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).127  Novopharm admitted 
 
 116. Id. at 82. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. at 86–87. 
 119. Id. at 86 (quoting In re Naylor, 369 F.2d 765, 788 (C.C.P.A. 1966)). 
 120. 52 F.3d 1043, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 1045. 
 126. See id. at 1046–47.  December 1995 was still, however, long before the expiration 
date of the ‘431 patent, which was set to expire in 2002. See id. 
 127. See id. at 1047.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) provides in part, 
It shall be an act of infringement to submit— 
  (A) an application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act or described in section 505(b)(2) of such Act for a drug claimed in a 
patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in 
the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug or veterinary or biological 
product claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the 
expiration of such patent. 
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infringement of the claims, but countered that that ‘431 patent was invalid 
for anticipation by the ‘658 patent.128 
The Federal Circuit stated that a claim is only anticipated if a single prior 
art reference expressly or inherently encompasses all the limitations of that 
claim.129  For a finding of inherent anticipation, it was necessary that a 
PHOSITA appreciate the inherently missing characteristics.130  The district 
court below found the ‘431 patent valid and infringed because the ‘658 
patent did not always produce the ‘431 polymorph of ranitidine 
hydrochloride, and in so doing expressly rejected the anticipation 
argument.131  The Federal Circuit affirmed because the district court’s 
ruling was not clearly erroneous.132 
The first open conflict between the two schools of thought on inherent 
anticipation occurred in Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mayo Foundation for 
Medical Education and Research.133  The patent at issue was directed 
toward a method of generating transgenic mice.134  The district court below 
held Elan’s patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 5,612,486 and 5,850,003 or the ‘486 
and ‘003 patents, respectively) invalid for anticipation by the Mullan patent 
(U.S. Patent No. 5,455,169 or the ‘169 patent).135  The majority opinion 
authored by Judge Newman reversed the district court’s finding, holding 
that the legal requirements were not met to establish anticipation.136  The 
Federal Circuit panel found no inherent anticipation, stating, “The single 
reference must describe and enable the claimed invention, including all 
claim limitations, with sufficient clarity and detail to establish that the 
subject matter already existed in the prior art and that its existence was 
recognized by persons of ordinary skill in the field of the invention.”137  
Judge Newman’s opinion pointed out that “[a]lthough Mullan described 
known procedures for making a transgenic animal, he neither described 
 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006).  Thus, the act of filing an ANDA is deemed to be an act of 
infringement, enabling the patent holder (Glaxo Inc.) to bring a lawsuit prior to FDA 
approval, if the purpose of such ANDA is to obtain FDA approval prior to the expiration of a 
patent that claims the use of the drug.  
 128. Glaxo Inc., 52 F.3d at 1047. 
 129. See id. at 1047. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 1047. 
 132. See id. at 1047–48. 
 133. 304 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2002), vacated, 314 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc), 
aff’d on other grounds, 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 134. See id. at 1221.  These transgenic mice were genetically altered to contain, in 
addition to their normal mouse genome, a mutated human gene called the “Swedish 
mutation,” because the gene was isolated from the cells of a Swedish family having an 
unusually high incidence of early-onset Alzheimer's disease. Id. at 1223–24.  These 
transgenic mice would produce a detectable amount of amyloid precursor protein (APP), 
which is common in brains of people with Alzheimer's disease. See id. 
 135. See id. at 1223. 
 136. See id.  The ‘169 patent issued after Dr. Mullan located a Swedish family susceptible 
to Alzheimer’s disease, isolated the mutated gene and its protein, and expressed the 
mutation. See id. at 1224.  He did not, however, make a transgenic mouse. See id. at 1226.  
By contrast, the ‘486 and ‘003 patents encompassed the limitations of transgenic mice and 
the unpredictability of their production. See id. at 1226–27. 
 137. Id. at 1227–28 (emphasis added). 
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every element of the claims, nor taught, in terms other than by trial and 
error and hope, production of a transgenic mouse.”138  In support of this 
holding, Judge Newman recited Elan’s argument that successful transgenic 
mice production was unpredictable, so much so that the transgenic mouse 
was produced by Mayo’s technology on the 2,576th attempt.139 
The first Elan decision prompted a strong dissent from Judge Dyk, who 
was concerned that the panel’s decision allowed for patenting “existing 
inventions” while at the same time contradicting recent Federal Circuit case 
law.140  As to the issue of inherency, Judge Dyk stated, “It matters not that 
those of ordinary skill heretofore may not have recognized these inherent 
characteristics.”141   
After reconsideration en banc, the first Elan decision was vacated and the 
case was remanded to the panel for further consideration.  In the second 
panel decision, Judge Newman stated that the patent was not invalid for 
inherent anticipation because the prior art reference was nonenabling.142  
Judge Newman did make it clear that, in her opinion, an enabling prior art 
reference alone was insufficient to find inherent anticipation.143  The 
Federal Circuit then remanded the case for a determination of whether the 
‘169 patent enabled a PHOSITA to make and use the invention without 
undue experimentation.144 
Although there seems ample precedent in the case law that a finding of 
inherent anticipation requires that a PHOSITA recognize and appreciate the 
inherent characteristics, the opposite—namely that a PHOSITA need not 
recognize the inherent feature—also enjoyed substantial support in the case 
law. 
B.  PHOSITA Recognition Not Required 
The second school of thought regarding inherent anticipation has been 
championed primarily by Judge Rader, and expressly disregards PHOSITA 
recognition as necessary to establish a finding of inherent anticipation.145  
In Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,146 for example, 
recognition of inherent characteristics was irrelevant for patentability.147  
The patent at issue in Abbott Laboratories concerned Abbott’s “Form IV” 
anhydrous terazosin hydrochloride, a drug to treat hypertension and “benign 
prostatic hyperplasia,” and was issued as U.S. Patent No. 5,504,207 (the 
 
 138. Id. at 1228 (emphasis added). 
 139. See id. at 1228 n.4. 
 140. Id. at 1231 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. (citing In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 142. See Elan Pharms. Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051, 
1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We conclude that Elan’s arguments are more properly characterized 
as enablement arguments rather than inherency arguments.”). 
 143. See id. at 1055. 
 144. See id. at 1057. 
 145. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 27, at 101–02; De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 71–83. 
 146. 182 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 147. See id. at 1319. 
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‘207 patent).148  Between 1989 and 1992, Byron Chemical Company, who 
was not a party to the lawsuit, sold three lots of anhydrous terazosin 
hydrochloride:  two to Geneva Pharmaceuticals and one to Warner Chilcott 
Laboratories.149  Abbott developed the Warner Chilcott lot into its “Form 
IV” product and filed its patent application in 1994.150 
Three of Abbott’s competitors—Novopharm Ltd.; Invamed, Inc.; and 
Geneva Pharmaceuticals—filed ANDAs seeking approval to make and 
distribute generic versions of the ‘207 material containing the Form IV 
anhydrate.151  Abbott sued for infringement pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(2)(A).152  The competitors countered that the ‘207 patent was 
invalid, and therefore not infringed, because the claimed material violated 
the § 102(b) on-sale statutory bar, “asserting that Form IV was anticipated 
because it was sold in the United States more than one year before the ‘207 
patent’s filing date, October 18, 1994.”153  Abbott tried to argue that neither 
Byron Chemical nor the defendants knew that the “invention” (Form IV 
anhydrate) was “on sale” because “the parties must ‘conceive,’ or know 
precisely, the nature of the subject matter with which they are dealing.”154 
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded.155  Instead, the court focused its 
inquiry on the three commercial sales that occurred before the critical filing 
date of October 18, 1994, noting that the subjective knowledge of the 
parties to the sale was irrelevant.156  The court, rejecting Abbott’s 
argument, stated, “If a product that is offered for sale inherently possesses 
each of the limitations of the claims, then the invention is on sale, whether 
or not the parties to the transaction recognize that the product possesses the 
claimed characteristics.”157  Thus, an inquiry into whether the parties—both 
PHOSITAs—knew (recognized or appreciated) at the time that they were 
dealing with Form IV anhydrate or not was immaterial to the analysis of 
inherent properties and their effect on patentability.158 
Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc.159 follows similar reasoning.  Judge 
Rader authored the opinion in Atlas Powder Co., explicitly holding, 
“Inherency is not necessarily coterminous with the knowledge of those of 
ordinary skill in the art.”160  The court explained, “Insufficient prior 
understanding of the inherent properties of a known composition does not 
defeat a finding of anticipation.”161  In Atlas Powder Co., the Federal 
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Circuit considered two patents—the Clay patent (U.S. Patent No. 
4,111,727), and its reissue patent (U.S. Patent No. RE 33,788).  The district 
court held both the Clay patent and its reissue patent invalid for anticipation 
by either the Egly patent (U.S. Patent No. 3,161,551) or by the Butterworth 
patent (U.K. Patent No. 1,306,546).162  Both the Clay patent and its reissue 
patent claimed explosive compositions composed of ammonium nitrate and 
fuel oil (ANFO) as well as an unsensitized water-in-oil emulsion.163  
Although the anticipating prior art references did not encompass the exact 
chemical compositions as the Clay and reissue patents, they did disclose 
blasting compositions containing a water-in-oil emulsion and ANFO with 
ingredients identical to those of the Clay patents in overlapping amounts.164  
The Egly and Butterworth patents did not explicitly disclose a “sufficient 
aeration” limitation, however, which was explicitly included in the Clay 
patent disclosure.165  The Federal Circuit found that the aeration limitation 
was “inevitably and inherently” present in the prior art, thus rendering the 
claims of the Clay and reissue patents unpatentable.166  Judge Rader, in 
affirming the district court’s holding, stated, “this court detects no error in 
the district court’s conclusion that ‘sufficient aeration . . . to enhance 
sensitivity’ is understood by those of ordinary skill in the art.”167  Because 
“sufficient aeration” was inherently present in the prior art, “it is irrelevant 
that the prior art did not recognize the key aspect of [the Clay patent’s] 
alleged invention.”168 
Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner169 further supports the idea 
that insufficient understanding or appreciation by those of ordinary skill in 
the art should not defeat a finding of anticipation. In that case, the Federal 
Circuit held a patent invalid for inherent anticipation even though a critical 
property of the claimed alloy was not expressly disclosed in the prior art 
reference.170  In reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit held that 
inherent anticipation was established even though a PHOSITA did not 
appreciate the inherent property of “good corrosion resistance in hot brine 
environments,” despite the fact that such a property was a newly discovered 
characteristic.171  Thus, Titanium Metals Corp. and Atlas Powder Co. seem 
to stand for the proposition that inherent anticipation may be established 
whether or not a PHOSITA knows or appreciates the inherent feature or 
characteristic. 
Cases following similar reasoning are MEHL/Biophile International 
Corp. v. Milgraum172 and In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation.173 In 
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Cruciferous Sprout, several patents directed at the production and 
consumption of the sprouts of certain types of cruciferous seeds (such as 
broccoli and cauliflower) were held invalid for anticipation.174  The 
patented sprouts are rich in glucosinolates, which have high Phase 2 
enzyme-inducing potential and therefore make them potent anticancer 
agents.175  The defendants claimed that the patents were invalid for 
anticipation in light of the prior art, which disclosed methods for 
germinating and harvesting cruciferous seeds without explicitly disclosing 
the importance of glucosinolates.176  The district court below granted the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, stating that “plant[s] (broccoli 
sprouts), long well known in nature and cultivated and eaten by humans for 
decades, [cannot] be patented merely on the basis of a recent realization that 
the plant has always had some heretofore unknown but naturally occurring 
beneficial feature.”177  The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the 
patents were anticipated in light of the prior art, stating that, “the 
glucosinolate content and Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential of these 
sprouts are inherent properties of the sprouts put there by nature, not by [the 
patentee].”178  The discovery of inherent, unappreciated properties of 
previously patented products was not the discovery of something new, and 
thus, was not worthy of patent protection. 
In MEHL/Biophile, the Federal Circuit held that a patent claiming a 
method of hair removal using lasers was invalid for anticipation in light of a 
prior art article teaching the “alignment of the laser light over a hair 
follicle.”179  Judge Rader again wrote the opinion, stating that it was “of no 
import[ance]” that the prior art reference’s authors did not appreciate the 
necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended.180 
C.  Settling the Debate, for Now:  Schering Corp. v. Geneva 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
The Federal Circuit issued its landmark ruling on the subject of inherent 
anticipation in the case of Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,181 holding that recognition of the inherent feature in a prior art 
reference by a PHOSITA was not necessary to sustain a finding of inherent 
anticipation.182  Part II.C.1 will outline the procedural history of Schering 
Corp.  Part II.C.2 will discuss the case on appeal to the Federal Circuit.  
Part II.C.3 then concludes by highlighting the Federal Circuit’s denial of en 
banc review. 
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1.  The Procedural History 
The District of New Jersey granted summary judgment invalidating 
claims in Schering Corporation’s patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,659,716 or the 
‘716 patent) directed at antihistamines.183  Schering also owned U.S. Patent 
No. 4,282,233 (the ‘233 patent), likewise directed at antihistamines, 
specifically loratadine, the pharmacologically active ingredient in 
Claritin.184  The ‘716 patent covered descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL), a 
metabolically formed byproduct of loratadine.185  Structurally, loratadine 
and DCL differ only in that loratadine has a carboethoxy group  on a ring 
nitrogen, while DCL has a hydrogen atom on that ring nitrogen.186  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding that the ‘233 
patent inherently anticipates the ‘716 patent.187 
The defendant pharmaceutical companies sought to manufacture generic 
versions of Claritin upon the expiration of the ‘233 patent, with each 
appellee submitting applications to the FDA.188  The applications contained 
a certification denying the validity of the ‘716 patent, which was listed in 
the Orange Book for loratadine.189  Upon receiving notice of the FDA 
filings, Schering filed suit for patent infringement pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(2)(A).190  Cross motions for summary judgment were filed by both 
parties.191 
The claims as construed by the district court covered DCL in all of its 
forms, including “metabolized within the human body” and “synthetically 
produced in a purified and isolated form.”192  Both parties agreed to that 
claim construction, and further stipulated that, at the time the ‘716 
application was filed, a PHOSITA would not recognize that administration 
of loratadine produced the metabolite DCL in the human body.193  The 
district court then found that the ‘233 patent did not expressly disclose 
DCL, but that DCL was necessarily formed as a result of practicing the 
‘233 patent.194  By 1985, Schering and its scientists “consistently 
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characterized DCL as the ‘active metabolite’ of loratadine in humans . . . 
the ‘major active circulating metabolite’ of loratadine in humans, and a 
‘known active metabolite’ of loratadine in humans in scientific 
publications.”195 
The district court invalidated several claims of the ‘716 patent as 
inherently anticipated, noting that, “there [was] no genuine issue that the 
consumption of loratadine by humans, with a wide variety of health 
statuses, necessarily results in the natural production in the human body of 
the DCL metabolite.”196  The court explained that, “the natural, inevitable 
production of metabolic DCL upon human ingestion of loratadine, although 
not fully appreciated by persons of ordinary skill in that field until more 
recently than 1984, demonstrates that this process is an ‘inherent 
characteristic or functioning’ of the use of loratadine.”197  Thus, the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted invalidating 
Schering’s patent, and Schering appealed to the Federal Circuit. 
2.  The Appeal to the Federal Circuit 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling of summary 
judgment, holding the ‘716 patent invalid for inherent anticipation in light 
of the prior art.198  The court used this case to explain the proper 
interpretation of previous case law—a prior art reference may anticipate 
without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if:  (1) that missing 
characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating 
reference, and (2) that inherency was a “natural result” that flowed with 
certainty from the disclosure in the prior art.199  Cases like Tilghman and 
Eibel Process Co. were distinguished as cases dealing “with ‘accidental, 
unwitting, and unappreciated’ anticipation,” standing for the proposition 
that inherency did not require recognition by a PHOSITA.200  When the 
result in question is deemed born out of accidental conditions, such results 
do not run afoul of the novelty provision for patentability.201 
The Federal Circuit stated frankly, in an opinion authored by Judge 
Rader, “At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent 
anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”202  Thus, the Schering 
Corp. decision resolved the long standing intracircuit split,203 making it 
quite clear a prior art reference anticipates even when it fails to disclose a 
feature of the claimed invention, so long as the missing characteristic is 
“necessarily present, or inherent” in that reference.204  Judge Rader used 
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this opportunity to clarify prior Federal Circuit cases that were previously 
viewed as holding that a PHOSITA must recognize the missing (inherent) 
characteristic to support a finding of inherent anticipation.205  For instance, 
the court remarked that Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., stood “for 
the proposition that inherency, like anticipation itself, requires a 
determination of the meaning of the prior art.”206  Therefore, the Federal 
Circuit did not require PHOSITA recognition.  Rather, it merely attempted 
to view the scope of the relevant prior art through the eyes of a PHOSITA, 
and thus resolve any factual questions about the subject matter expressly 
and inherently within the references under examination.207  In other words, 
the court observed that Continental Can Co. merely requires that the 
Federal Circuit resort to the opinions of “skilled artisans” to determine if 
the inherent feature exists in the prior art at all.208  Moreover, according to 
Judge Rader, summary judgment on inherent anticipation in Continental 
Can Co. was vacated due to conflicting expert testimonies on the existence 
of the inherent feature.209 
After dispensing with the argument that inherent anticipation requires 
PHOSITA recognition of the inherent feature, the court described the issue 
in Schering Corp. as being one “of first impression.”210  The court noted 
that the prior art references put forward by the defendants “supplie[d] no 
express description of any part of the claimed subject matter.”211  Previous 
Federal Circuit case law contained examples of prior art references having 
an “incomplete description of the anticipatory subject matter,” with the 
inherency doctrine supplying the missing feature.212  By contrast, the 
defendants in Schering Corp. were not seeking to use the inherent 
anticipation doctrine to plug gaps in the prior art.  They were, instead, 
“ask[ing] [the] court to find anticipation when the entire structure of the 
claimed subject matter is inherent in the prior art.”213  Judge Rader found 
no reason why the doctrine of inherent anticipation should be limited to 
situations involving an undisclosed feature.214  Judge Rader’s opinion in 
Schering Corp. has made it clear that the doctrine of inherent anticipation 
may well be used to invalidate entire inventions.215 
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The Schering Corp. decision also clarified that an anticipatory reference 
“need only enable subject matter that falls within the scope of the claims at 
issue, nothing more.”216  Actual creation or reduction to practice of the 
prior art subject matter are not required for the purposes of an anticipation 
inquiry.217  Applying this rule to the facts in Schering Corp., the court 
found that the ‘233 patent qualified as an enabling anticipatory reference if 
it “describe[d] how to make DCL in any form encompassed by a compound 
claim covering DCL . . . .”218  This, then, would include DCL as a 
metabolite in a patient’s body.  Since the ‘716 patent covers DCL in any 
form, the ‘233 patent would then inherently anticipate its claims so long as 
it enables a PHOSITA to make DCL.  Because a PHOSITA could practice 
the ‘233 patent without undue experimentation, the ‘233 patent enables and 
is an anticipatory reference under the Federal Circuit’s doctrine of 
anticipation.219 
Judge Rader explained that patent protection could still be available for 
metabolites of pharmaceutical compounds so long as they were properly 
claimed, and provided guidance for future drafters seeking such 
protection.220  The metabolite could be claimed in its pure and isolated 
form;221 or it might be claimed as a pharmaceutical composition (bonded to 
an acceptable pharmaceutical carrier).222  In the alternative, the “drafter 
could also claim a method of administering the metabolite or the 
corresponding pharmaceutical composition.”223  Thus, according to Judge 
Rader, proper claiming avoids the inherent anticipation doctrine 
promulgated under Schering Corp. 
3.  Denial of En Banc Review 
Did Judge Rader’s opinion in Schering Corp. violate the Federal 
Circuit’s local rules by overruling a binding precedent via panel 
decision?224  It appeared that way to Judges Newman and Lourie, who 
dissented from the denial of en banc review.225 
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Judge Newman was concerned that, by finding anticipation of an entire 
compound not known in the prior art and that did not previously exist, the 
Schering Corp. decision departed from the “established law of 
anticipation.”226  Judge Newman objected to what she viewed as “panel 
disruption” of existing precedent, stating that if the law were to be changed 
in this manner it required “en banc action.”227  Judge Newman argued that 
the court’s precedent was entirely contradictory to the panel’s holding in 
Schering Corp. that DCL was unpatentable simply because it existed, even 
if no one knew that it existed.228  Most troubling for Judge Newman was 
the fact that no prior art reference disclosed the claimed DCL, and that a 
PHOSITA would not have known that DCL was formed upon ingestion of 
loratadine by patients.229  Judge Newman was uncertain as to the 
implications of the panel’s holding for the patenting of products that had 
not yet been discovered, but desired that the court “speak with one voice on 
this important question.”230 
Judge Lourie also dissented, going so far as to call the court’s 
“extraordinary decision” preclusive to “virtually all patents on human 
metabolites of drugs.”231  This fact alone, in the eyes of Judge Lourie, 
mandated en banc review of the Schering Corp. decision.232 
Judge Lourie’s dissent also addressed the practical implications of the 
Schering Corp. decision on the patentability of pharmaceutical compounds 
and their metabolites.233  He was concerned that the Schering Corp. 
decision would effectively preclude patent protection for these metabolites, 
arguing that the court had essentially endorsed the holding that existing 
patents may be effective prior art references to the metabolites they 
generate.234  Judge Lourie did not question the notion that a pharmaceutical 
product is unpatentable when it is “in actual public use” prior to the filing 
of a patent application.235  Rather, he took issue with a decision “hold[ing] 
that an enabling disclosure of ‘how to make’ metabolites is provided by the 
mere recitation that one can administer a prior art compound to humans.”236  
 
panel will decide whether to ask the regular active judges to consider hearing the case en 
banc.”); see also Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(denying rehearing en banc). 
 225. See Schering Corp., 348 F.3d at 994–95 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also id. at 996 
(Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 226. Id. at 993 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 227. Id. at 995. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 232. See id. 
 233. See id. at 995–96. 
 234. See id. 
 235. Id. at 996. 
 236. Id.  Judge Lourie noted, however, that he would have ruled differently if the ‘233 
really taught how to make metabolites.  “However, that patent simply included a minimal, 
boilerplate statement of how to use the claimed products, sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, but far from the careful and thorough prescribing 
information required by the FDA.” Id. 
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Whether a pharmaceutical product patent owner would desire or require a 
patent on a metabolite should not be the issue, Judge Lourie stated.237  The 
holding “that a patent on a product, with a minimal disclosure of 
administering it to a human or other subject, anticipates a later application 
on a metabolite, of which no mention appears whatsoever in the patent, 
cannot be correct.”238 
The Federal Circuit’s subsequent decision in the SmithKline case, 
however, indicates that the court has formally accepted the rule established 
by Schering Corp., despite the panel’s detractors.239 
4.  Formal Acceptance of Schering Corp.:  The Case of SmithKline 
Beecham  Corp. v. Apotex Corp. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp. endorsed the idea that 
PHOSITA recognition of inherent properties was unnecessary to sustain a 
finding of inherent anticipation.240  Judge Posner, sitting by designation, 
authored the opinion dismissing SmithKline’s suit for patent 
infringement.241  The patent at issue covered paroxetine (U.S. Patent No. 
4,721,723 or the ‘723 patent), an antidepressant drug that SmithKline sold 
under the brand name Paxil.242  Originally, paroxetine was patented by a 
British company called Ferrosan (the ‘196 patent).243  Ferrosan was not a 
manufacturer of pharmaceutical drugs, so it licensed the ‘196 materials, an 
anhydrous form of paroxetine, to SmithKline.244  Anhydrous materials are 
difficult to manufacture and maintain due to their tendency to become 
“soggy” with moisture, thus requiring special measures to control 
humidity.245  A pseudopolymorph of paroxetine, called a hemihydrate, was 
subsequently discovered by SmithKline in 1985.246  The hemihydrate was 
more stable and was more amenable to manufacturing than the original 
anhydrous material.247  SmithKline patented paroxetine hydrochloride 
hemihydrate, in which there is one water molecule for every two of the 
other molecules constituting the unit crystal cell, as the ‘723 patent, 
marketed as Paxil, in 1993.248 
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In 1998, six years after the expiration of the ‘196 patent, Apotex filed an 
ANDA seeking FDA approval to manufacture anhydrous paroxetine 
hydrochloride.249  SmithKline commenced suit against Apotex for 
infringement, claiming that any version of the ‘196 materials would 
necessarily contain the ‘723 materials, which was not set to expire until 
2006.250  In the alternative, SmithKline argued that the likelihood of 
producing the ‘723 hemihydrate was high even if Apotex was attempting to 
produce the ‘196 anhydrate because of a phenomenon known as 
“seeding.”251  Seeding would occur, SmithKline said, anytime the 
anhydrate was improperly handled, producing the hemihydrate from the 
anhydrate by way of conversion induced by “seeds,” which could be a 
single tiny crystal or a grain of dust.252  The ‘723 material would then 
multiply within the ‘196 material, “leveling off at a few percentage points” 
of the whole.253  Finally, SmithKline argued that even if Apotex was able to 
prevent the conversion of the ‘196 anhydrate into the ‘723 hemihydrate and 
avoid seeding altogether,254 Apotex would still infringe the ‘723 patent 
when patients ingested the ‘196 anhydrate and the human metabolism 
converted it into the stable hemihydrate in the warm, fluid human 
stomach.255 
Judge Posner ultimately ruled the ‘723 patent valid but not infringed.256  
Regarding the natural conversion of the ‘196 material to the ‘723 material, 
Judge Posner construed the relevant claim “to cover crystalline paroxetine 
hydrochloride hemihydrate in any commercially significant quantity, and so 
construed[,] the claim [was] valid against the various attacks on it made by 
Apotex but clearly [would] not be infringed by Apotex’s anhydrate 
product.”257  If the claim was valid and infringed by a single crystal of 
hemihydrate produced by Apotex, Judge Posner would allow Apotex a 
complete affirmative defense that SmithKline was the cause of the 
infringement.258  To allow any greater protection would be contrary to 
established laws of patent and equity.259  Judge Posner was also 
unconvinced that the ‘196 materials inherently contained the ‘723 materials, 
stating, “I am not persuaded that Apotex will produce an anhydrate that has 
 
 249. See id. at 1023. 
 250. See id. at 1023–24. 
 251. Id. at 1020–21. 
 252. See id. 
 253. Id. at 1023. 
 254. See id. at 1020–21.  One witness, testifying for SmithKline, proposed an interesting 
scenario for Apotex if they wished to avoid “seeding” and infringement of the ‘723 patent:  
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thus, avoid infringement. See id. 
 255. See id. at 1014. 
 256. See id. at 1052. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See id. 
 259. See id. at 1046. 
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sufficient hemihydrate to be detectable by the methods in use in 1985.”260  
Thus, the ‘723 patent was valid and immune from an inherent anticipation 
attack. 
The case went to the Federal Circuit on appeal, where Judge Rader 
dispensed of Judge Posner’s conclusions, holding the patent invalid for 
being in public use in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).261  Initially, Judge 
Rader’s panel did not use the inherent anticipation doctrine to invalidate the 
patent.  Instead, the panel reasoned that it ran afoul of the public use bar 
because the drug was administered to patients without any apparent 
confidentiality restrictions on the patients or the administering physicians 
during the clinical trials.262  Addressing “miscellaneous issues,” Judge 
Rader opined that if SmithKline proved that Apotex committed contributory 
infringement by showing that the anhydrate necessarily converts to the 
hemihydrate upon ingestion, SmithKline would have also clearly shown 
that the ‘723 patent was invalid for inherent anticipation in light of the ‘196 
patent.263  This point is dictum, however, because the appeal by SmithKline 
for contributory infringement was moot as it ran afoul of the prior use 
bar.264 
Pursuant to an order en banc, Judge Rader’s panel again considered the 
SmithKline case on remand, affirming the previous panel’s decision 
invalidating the ‘723 patent, this time via the doctrine of inherent 
anticipation.265  Judge Rader explained that the ‘196 patent suffices as an 
anticipatory reference if it discloses in an enabling manner the production 
of the hemihydrate.266  Because the ‘196 patent, when practiced, enabled a 
PHOSITA to naturally produce the hemihydrate claimed by the ‘723 patent, 
the ‘723 patent was invalid for anticipation.267  Judge Rader explicitly 
stated that a finding of inherent anticipation “does not require a person of 
ordinary skill in the art to recognize the inherent disclosure in the prior art 
at the time the prior art is created.”268  The record contained clear and 
convincing evidence that production of paroxetine anhydrate as per the ‘196 
patent inherently results in at least trace amounts of the hemihydrate, and 
the “court’s law does not require Apotex to take extraordinary measures to 
practice the prior art without infringing [the ‘723 patent].”269  Judge Rader 
did note, however, that SmithKline could obtain a patent for an inherently 
 
 260. Id. at 1036. 
 261. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 
2004), vacated, 403 F.3d 1328, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 403 
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 262. See id. at 1317. 
 263. Id. at 1320. 
 264. See id. 
 265. See SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1334. 
 266. See id. at 1344. 
 267. See id. 
 268. Id. at 1343 (citing Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 
(Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 269. Id. at 1345.  One such extraordinary measure would be the requirement that Apotex 
build a plant not “seeded” with the hemihydrates. 
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anticipated compound using the proper claims, and that the holding merely 
prevented SmithKline from obtaining patent protection for the “bare 
compound” claimed in the ‘723 patent.270 
Judge Newman dissented from the denial of a rehearing en banc, 
expressly stating her concern that the court “has preserved the opinion’s 
enlargement of the ground of invalidity called ‘inherent anticipation.’”271  
Noting that the hemihydrate was first discovered in 1985 and may have 
existed in 1984, Judge Newman wondered, “how then can it have been 
‘inherently disclosed,’ in a patent application filed in 1975?”272  Comparing 
the court’s decision to precedent, Judge Newman pointed out that there was 
“no evidence whatsoever that the hemihydrate existed at the time the 
anhydrate patent application was filed, and no evidence that such existence 
would have been recognized [by a PHOSITA].”273  Judge Newman 
endorsed the view that the inherent anticipation doctrine should be limited 
to “situations where the common knowledge of technologists is not 
recorded in the reference; that is, where technological facts are known to 
those in the field of the invention.”274  To Judge Newman, inherent 
anticipation required that a PHOSITA knew, or should have known, of the 
presence of the inherent characteristics, “not that it might have lain hidden 
in minuscule amount, undetected, unsuspected, and unknown.”275  In Judge 
Newman’s opinion, the expansion of the doctrine of inherent anticipation to 
a product that may exist in trace amounts calls the patentability of 
antibiotics, hormones, antibodies, and other products into question.276  
According to Judge Newman, this results in uncertainty regarding existing 
patents, and the loss of incentives to search for the beneficial components of 
existing materials.277  If a product’s existence is not known to a PHOSITA, 
Judge Newman argued, it cannot later be retrospectively “inherently 
anticipated.”278 
Although SmithKline was decided later, it was the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Schering Corp. that settled the debate about whether PHOSITA 
recognition was required to sustain a finding of inherent anticipation.  The 
court held that inherent anticipation is not dependent on whether PHOSITA 
recognizes or appreciates the missing properties of the invention.279  The 
proper inquiry, rather, is whether the result was “accidental,” obtained 
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“under unusual conditions,” or a “natural result flowing from the explicit 
disclosure of the prior art.”280 
D.  Predictions for the Future of Metabolite Research 
Until the Supreme Court provides further guidance, the controversial rule 
promulgated under Schering Corp. remains the final word on PHOSITA 
recognition in an inherent anticipation analysis.  Will the Federal Circuit’s 
expansion of the inherent anticipation doctrine stifle future metabolite 
research?  Commentators are as divided as the case law. 
One commentator argues that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Schering 
Corp. seems harsh on its face, but its future impact is limited because 
subsequent cases have strictly applied the “necessary and inevitable 
consequence” test.281  Another commentator argues that the Federal Circuit 
has created “a substantial danger to innovation” through its expansion of the 
inherent anticipation doctrine.282  By removing the recognition requirement, 
the Federal Circuit has expanded the doctrine and has created “a dangerous 
weapon against innovation,” even though its public policy goals may be 
admirable.283  Other commentators posit that excessive application of the 
inherent anticipation doctrine chills the stated policy goals of the patent 
system, goals like encouraging investment, innovation, and full public 
disclosure of new inventions.284  Yet another commentator believes that the 
clarification of the inherent anticipation doctrine by Schering Corp. may 
actually undermine the doctrine itself by creating a burden that litigants are 
unable to overcome.285  Could this doctrine be overtly problematic to some 
inventors, yet still be kept in check?  At least one commentator believes so.  
Inherent anticipation is particularly problematic as applied against chemical 
compounds, but the effect is tempered by the court’s requirement that the 
chemical compound at issue must form in readily detectable amounts upon 
ingestion for the doctrine to be triggered.286 
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 281. See Chen, supra note 27, at 119–20 (citing Toro Co. v. Deere & Co., 355 F.3d 1313, 
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 282. De La Rosa, supra note 27, at 89 (arguing that pharmaceutical companies will likely 
be dissuaded from investing in the research and development of metabolites as a result of 
Schering Corp., because they will not be able to patent their discoveries and recoup their 
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granted by Congress is admirable, but alternative means to accomplish this goal exist). 
 284. See Mueller & Chisum, supra note 3, at 1105. 
 285. See Alloway, supra note 60, at 93 (arguing that the limited understanding of many 
biotechnology inventions may render impossible an accurate determination of whether an 
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determination must be made). 
 286. See A. Meaghin Burke, Comment, New Approaches to Pharmaceutical Patent Law:  
Why Current Patent Jurisprudence Is Inappropriate As Applied to the Unique 
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Indeed, the predictions about the effects of the inherent anticipation 
doctrine on metabolite research are wide ranging, due largely in part to the 
rule promulgated under Schering Corp. and its progeny that a PHOSITA 
need not recognize the inherent feature.  Whether or not the doctrine will 
actually stifle pharmaceutical research into metabolites remains to be seen.  
This uncertainty has not, however, quelled the calls for a reformation of the 
doctrine by commentators and patent practitioners alike, especially as it is 
applied against the unpredictable biological, chemical, and pharmaceutical 
arts. 
III.  TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT IN THE TIME OF SCHERING CORP.:  
REEXAMINING THE DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF OUR RAPIDLY EXPANDING 
BASE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
The utterly confusing nature of the inherent anticipation doctrine has not 
only prompted calls for its reform, but also its outright abolishment.287  Part 
III.A will examine several proposed changes to the doctrine of inherent 
anticipation to make it less difficult to apply in future cases.  Part III.B will 
propose a new “capability” standard for courts grappling with issues of 
inherency in patent law.  This standard would focus primarily on what a 
PHOSITA was capable of discovering, and would require a factual 
determination as to the nature of scientific technology at the date of the 
potentially anticipating reference. 
A.  Proposed Changes to the Doctrine 
One commentator has proposed that the doctrine should be applied 
strictly and narrowly in future cases to avoid the potential chilling effects 
on innovation.288  This is not a proposed solution to the doctrine itself but 
only to its application in biological and chemical patent cases.  If the 
inherency analysis is strictly applied in biological and chemical cases where 
an absolute certainty of result exists, the chilling effects of the inherent 
anticipation doctrine should be limited.289  Under this proposal, the doctrine 
“would only invalidate claims that merely recite scientific explanations of 
preexisting subject matters.”290  Another commentator proposes a 
seemingly opposite solution:  inventions directed at the biological and 
chemical arts pose their own special problems291—namely, 
 
Characteristics of Chemical Compounds, 75 MISS. L.J. 1143, 1163 (2006) (citing Schering 
Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 287. See Mueller & Chisum, supra note 3, at 1107, 1163–64 (proposing cabining the 
doctrine altogether in favor of more robust tools for policing patent validity, such as the 
nonobviousness requirement). 
 288. See Chen, supra note 27, at 119–21. 
 289. See id. 
 290. Id. at 121. 
 291. See Alloway, supra note 60, at 93 (“Given the limited understanding of many 
biotechnology inventions, it may not be possible for the courts to accurately determine 
whether an inherent characteristic or result is necessary and inevitable at the time that such a 
determination must be made.  Scientific understanding of the mechanisms of biological 
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unpredictability—which is precisely why the inherent anticipation doctrine 
needs to be relaxed, not tightened, when applied against such inventions.292  
The very nature of biological and chemical patents should make courts 
pause when considering whether “poorly-understood biotechnological 
inventions” are inherently anticipated.293 
Other commentators have suggested that inherency is best understood 
from a public benefit perspective.294  The doctrine does not require 
substantial change; a proper inherency analysis simply seeks to determine 
whether or not the public already benefits from the invention.295  The 
authors argue that this “public benefit” analysis makes sense from a public 
policy perspective.296  If a court determines that the public already benefits 
from an invention, the discovery of that benefit (or the causes for it) does 
not justify withdrawing it from the public domain by granting it patent 
protection.297  Conversely, if the public does not yet benefit from the 
discovery, then a “discovery or modification that gives the world a new 
benefit is precisely the sort of improvement that we want to encourage 
through patent protection.”298 
Substantive changes to the doctrine via the patent statute have also been 
proposed.  In patent cases where the inherent anticipation doctrine is 
applied, some commentators argue that prior art relied upon to establish that 
an invention is inherently anticipated should satisfy a heightened 
enablement standard.299  Patent law already requires that an anticipating 
reference enable a PHOSITA to make and use the invention described.300  
The Federal Circuit explained that the patent statute requires an individual 
to be able to replicate an invention without “undue experimentation.”301  In 
 
action underlying an invention, which may be required to determine the necessity and 
inevitability of the inherent characteristic or result, may only occur years later.”). 
 292. See id. at 77 (“[G]iven the particular problems associated with biotechnology 
inventions, and other inventions for which technological understanding is limited . . . courts 
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inherently anticipated.”). 
 293. Id. at 77 n.33. 
 294. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 374 (“[T]he inherency cases are all ultimately 
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 295. See id. (“If the public already benefits from the invention, even if they don’t know 
why, the invention is inherent in the prior art.  If the public doesn’t benefit from the 
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 296. See id. at 407. 
 297. See id. (arguing that such a discovery “adds only a modest amount to our 
technological capabilities and does not justify withdrawing from the public the benefit they 
already receive”). 
 298. Id. 
 299. See Mueller & Chisum, supra note 3, at 1108. 
 300. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of 
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
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I and accompanying text. 
 301. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[E]xperimentation needed 
to practice the invention must not be undue experimentation.”).  In determining whether 
experimentation is “undue,” the court weighs the following factors:  (1) the quantity of 
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cases where the doctrine of inherent anticipation is invoked to defeat 
patentability, however, “the level of enablement provided by the prior art 
through examples, instructions, or other guidance must be such that if 
followed, the prior artisan would inevitably achieve the claimed invention 
with at most de minimis experimentation.”302  The authors argue that the 
inherent anticipation doctrine should be used sparingly to defeat 
patentability, and posit that, under a heightened enablement theory, 
Schering Corp. might have been decided differently.303 
The need to balance the public’s desire for low-cost generic drugs with 
the need to incentivize pharmaceutical research into useful compounds has 
prompted calls for other kinds of reform.  At least one commentator has 
called for changes to the patent statute itself, allowing for a short patent 
term extension to an existing patent to protect newly discovered metabolites 
provided that the science is “sufficiently advanced.”304  This change, 
however, should be limited in scope to allow an individual to avoid liability 
for infringement if he unknowingly practices the metabolite or the prior 
art.305 
B.  Towards a New “Capability” Standard for Inherent 
Anticipation Analyses in Patent Cases 
Scientific advancement is proceeding rapidly.  Consider the following 
examples.  The storage capacity of computing hardware doubles every 
eighteen months but new biological data are doubling every nine months.306  
Researchers recently developed the most powerful brain simulation ever—
the Sequoia supercomputer at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory—
with a simulated 10 billion neurons and 100 trillion connections among 
them.307  When the Human Genome Project launched in 1990, the scientific 
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community was deeply skeptical about whether the project’s audacious 
goals could be achieved.  In April 2003, the International Human Genome 
Sequencing Consortium announced the successful completion of the 
project, mapping the genome to within 99.99% accuracy, more than two 
years ahead of schedule.308  Moore’s Law, simply stated, holds that the 
number of transistors that can be successfully placed on a processor will 
double approximately every eighteen months.  Although Moore’s Law held 
true for many decades, some believed that the end of Moore’s Law was 
near.309  But, in February 2012, researchers announced the successful 
production of a single-atom transistor that would effectively allow 
computer manufacturers to beat the physical limits of Moore’s law.310  At 
least one commentator believes that the rate of technological growth is 
exponential, rather than linear, and, at today’s rate, progress achieved in the 
next 100 years will actually resemble 20,000 years of progress, attributable 
mainly to synergistic feedback among the various fields of scientific 
research, including genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics.311  
Metabolomics (research concerned with the comprehensive characterization 
of the small molecule metabolites in biological systems) currently benefits 
from the “rapid pace” at which metabolite detection and elucidation 
techniques are evolving, with data reporting in this area having increased 
over 600 percent in recent years.312  As science uncovers more about the 
world, all we know with certainty is that we do not know much.313 
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We’ve split the atom and gone to the moon, spliced open the genome and saved 
countless lives with medicines. Yet as far as we’ve come, we have a long way to 
go. We continue to grapple with realties beyond our understanding, from the inner 
workings of our bodies to the intrinsic mechanics of the universe.  
Id. 
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The point of the previous paragraphs is not to trumpet the advancement 
of scientific progress, but merely to emphasize that the public’s analytical 
knowledge of the world advances at a rapidly increasing rate.  Metabolite 
research in particular has progressed exponentially, yet it remains in its 
infancy.314  In fact, the Metabolomics Society, whose goal is to promote the 
growth, use, and understanding of metabolomics in the life sciences, was 
only founded in 2004.315  Recent estimates hold that many chemical 
metabolites are currently unknown, but likely “play vital and previously 
unappreciated roles in human health and disease.”316  In fact, researchers 
have already successfully identified metabolites associated with chronic 
pain when found in higher than normal levels, a discovery that might lead 
to new treatment options for chronic pain sufferers.317  The notion that 
metabolism inactivates pharmaceutically active drugs seems antiquated in 
the face of increasing evidence that metabolites are just as efficacious, if not 
more so, than the parent drug they were derived from.318  In fact, their 
increased safety profile has led to the use of metabolites as a source for new 
drug candidates.319  Moreover, advanced technologies such as deep-
learning artificial intelligence programs and supercomputers are providing 
new means by which to identify promising new molecules for drug 
design.320 
Commentators who disagree about the scope or application of the 
inherent anticipation doctrine seem to agree, however, on the usefulness and 
beneficial aspects of metabolites.321  This Note agrees with previous 
scholarship that labels the discovery of metabolites as a “substantial 
discovery that advances science.”322  Unfortunately, pharmaceutical drug 
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2013] PROBLEMS AFTER SCHERING CORP.? 201 
research and design is a costly proposition.323  The average cost of bringing 
a new pharmaceutical entity to market is $500 million over a period of 
approximately twelve to fifteen years,324 with much of that time spent 
seeking FDA approval that the entity is safe for public use.325  Completely 
recouping the costs of developing a new drug can take manufacturers as 
long as twelve to nineteen years.326  Over recent years, branded 
pharmaceutical companies have seen a marked increase in competition from 
generic competitors, resulting in a shorter time frame where they may 
recoup their investment.327  Patent protection—the time-limited monopoly 
during which they may make the drug, and exclude others from making the 
same—is the primary manner by which branded pharmaceutical companies 
can protect their investments.  The expansion of the inherent anticipation 
doctrine under Schering Corp. is likely to dissuade pharmaceutical 
companies from fully disclosing their discoveries to the public via patent 
specifications,328 encouraging them instead to seek to protect their 
discoveries as trade secrets.  The Federal Circuit’s Judge Newman 
expressed a similar concern, stating that, “no newly discovered product 
found in an organism [could] be patented” under Schering Corp.329 
From a public policy perspective, recourse to trade secrets would 
hinder,330 rather than promote, the policy goal of full public disclosure that 
underlies U.S. patent law.331 
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or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, 
and . . . is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy”).  The Prefatory Note to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act indicates why a company 
would choose to maintain information as a trade secret as opposed to seeking patent 
protection: 
A valid patent provides a legal monopoly for seventeen years in exchange for 
public disclosure of an invention.  If, however, the courts ultimately decide that the 
Patent Office improperly issued a patent, an invention will have been disclosed to 
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Thus, in light of the importance of metabolite research to society, the 
public policy goals of the patent laws, and our rapidly expanding base of 
scientific knowledge, this Note suggests reforming the inherent anticipation 
doctrine.  The decision in Schering Corp. is notable for the establishment of 
a bright-line rule,332 but this rule will ultimately fail to keep pace with 
scientific advancement.333  The nature of scientific discovery necessitates a 
new standard for inherent anticipation analyses, which this Note terms a 
“capability” standard.  This proposed standard is a two-part inquiry that 
focuses on the state of the relevant art when the potentially anticipating 
prior art was disclosed.  Under this standard, a court dealing with inherency 
should ask two questions:  (1) Would the state of the relevant art at the time 
of the anticipating prior art reference permit a PHOSITA to detect the 
inherent feature?  (2) If it would, would a PHOSITA have been reasonably 
expected to detect it? 
The first prong of this analysis asks the court to make a factual 
determination about the state of the relevant art (e.g., biological, chemical, 
or pharmaceutical) at the time that the anticipating prior art reference was 
published.334  Such an inquiry would involve factual determinations about 
the state of scientific computing and analysis, technological capabilities, 
and scientific instrumentation during the relevant time period. 
For instance, consider a hypothetical drug A, patented in 1980.  Drug A 
has a useful metabolite, metabolite B, discovered in 2012.  Under this 
Note’s suggested “capability” standard, evidence could be presented either 
asserting or rebutting the notion that the technological capabilities of a 
PHOSITA living in the year 1980 made it possible for him to detect the 
inherent feature (metabolite B) which necessarily and inevitably follows 
from the administration of drug A to patients.  If metabolite B was 
 
competitors with no corresponding benefit.  In view of the substantial number of 
patents that are invalidated by the courts, many businesses now elect to protect 
commercially valuable information through reliance upon the state law of trade 
secret protection.  Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), which 
establishes that neither the Patent Clause of the United States Constitution nor the 
federal patent laws pre-empt state trade secret protection for patentable or 
unpatentable information, may well have increased the extent of this reliance.  
Id. prefatory n., 14 U.L.A. at 530.  The patent term length has since expanded from 
seventeen years to twenty years.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
 331. See De La Rosa, supra note 27 at 87–88 (“If Schering encourages recourse to trade 
secrets, then the policy goals of patent law have not been served because scientific 
advancement will not become readily accessible to the public.”). 
 332. See supra Part II.C. 
 333. A similar view has been expressed elsewhere in the scholarship on this topic. See 
Burke, supra note 286, at 1163 (“The term ‘readily detectable,’ however, produces special 
problems in the pharmaceutical context. As scientific equipment and methodology continue 
to improve, the Federal Circuit will have to return to the ‘readily detectable’ standard and 
clarify the requirement.”). 
 334. In cases involving drug metabolites, the anticipating prior art reference would likely 
be the patent issued on the parent drug. See Mueller & Chisum, supra note 3, at 1148 
(describing the argument of the generic drug company Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in 
Schering Corp. that the patent on the parent drug loratadine rendered the patent on its 
metabolites invalid as anticipated under a theory of inherency). 
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completely undetectable in 1980, but new scientific instruments and 
methodologies permitted its detection in 2012, the doctrine of inherent 
anticipation should not be invoked to defeat the novelty of metabolite B. 
If sufficient evidence demonstrates that a PHOSITA was capable of 
detecting the inherent feature as of the date of the potentially anticipatory 
prior art reference using 1980s technology, the second prong of this 
analysis would ask the court to consider whether or not a PHOSITA 
reasonably should have been expected to detect it.  Perhaps metabolite B is 
a pharmaceutically active metabolite responsible for the beneficial effects 
of drug A, or perhaps it is the dominant metabolic product of the body’s 
metabolism of drug A, or perhaps it is easily detectable in high 
concentrations in the blood.  In these cases, it is likely that a PHOSITA 
would have discovered the metabolite during the course of obtaining FDA 
approval, drug development, and other clinical studies.  If both of these 
prongs were satisfied, the patent on drug A would inherently anticipate 
metabolite B. 
But, perhaps metabolite B produces unforeseen side effects wholly 
unrelated to drug A’s intended use.  It is not uncommon for drugs to 
produce side effects that researchers had no reason to expect.335  Under the 
second prong of this Note’s proposed analysis, patent protection for 
metabolite B should not be precluded via inherent anticipation, even if the 
technology of the day permitted its detection.  The complex nature of the 
human body’s biological system produces strange, surprising, and often 
unforeseeable results when it encounters foreign agents such as active 
pharmaceutical entities. 
Under the inherent anticipation doctrine promulgated by Schering Corp. 
and reinforced by SmithKline, however, any undiscovered metabolites of 
drug A, including metabolite B, would be inherently anticipated and thus 
not patentable because they are a necessary and inevitable consequence of 
the administration of drug A.  Schering Corp. holds that it makes no 
difference if a PHOSITA knew about the metabolite in 1980, or if he was 
even capable of detecting its presence using the technology of the era.  Due 
to the costly nature of drug discovery and design, and the valuable nature of 
metabolite research to society in general, it behooves the Federal Circuit to 
reexamine the doctrine of inherent anticipation. 
CONCLUSION 
To date, the patent law doctrine of inherent anticipation remains mired in 
confusion, both in its present interpretation and its future application.  Much 
of this uncertainty stems from confusing precedent and a recent 
 
 335. See Viagra Touted As Life-Saving Heart Treatment—After Scientists Find It Makes 
Heart Muscles Less Stiff, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 23, 2011, 12:39 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2078139/Viagra-touted-life-saving-heart-
treatment--scientists-makes-heart-muscles-LESS-stiff.html (“The drug [Viagra] was first 
developed as a heart disease treatment—it’s more well-known use was simply a lucky side-
effect.”). 
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controversial decision in Schering Corp. that seemingly bucks that 
precedent in favor of the rule that PHOSITA recognition of the inherent 
feature is not required for inherent anticipation.  Calls for doctrinal reform, 
and even outright dispensation of the doctrine itself, abound.  In the absence 
of reform, however, inherency challenges against patent applicants seeking 
to protect their technological inventions are only likely to grow as society’s 
scientific knowledge increases.  With its decision in Schering Corp., the 
court has placed upon itself the daunting challenge of determining whether 
or not a feature is inherent within the prior art.  Such a determination is 
typically problematic for the scientists and inventors behind these 
discoveries, given the vast complexities associated with technological 
inventions.  It will be nearly impossible for the court to accurately assess 
whether or not a feature is truly inherent in the prior art as our technological 
capabilities quickly outpace the patent laws.  The Federal Circuit should 
reexamine, and strongly consider reforming, the doctrine of inherent 
anticipation in light of these advancements.  This Note suggests one 
possible method of reform that focuses an inherent anticipation analysis on 
the state of the relevant art at the time an asserted prior art reference was 
published to determine whether or not a PHOSITA was even capable of 
determining the presence of the inherent feature, and if he was, whether or 
not he should have reasonably been expected to find it.  By focusing its 
analysis on facts that are readily ascertainable (such as the state of the 
relevant art at the time the anticipating prior art reference was published), as 
opposed to those facts which may only come to light years after a 
technological invention is disclosed (such as an inherent feature which is a 
necessary and inevitable consequence of practicing the prior art), the court 
could alleviate much of the confusion plaguing the doctrine of inherent 
anticipation. 
 
